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Enoch Powell: The lonesome leader
Ben Wellings
Introduction
By all accounts Enoch Powell was not someone you would warm to, but his 
personal awkwardness was offset by his enduring popular appeal—a charisma 
that enabled support for his political causes to cross class boundaries and party 
affiliations. Despite his education and erudition—or perhaps because of it—
he appealed to the working classes and Labour voters, and appeared as a man 
speaking truth unto power, unafraid to break the political taboos of the day 
and thereby appealing to individuals who similarly felt silenced by political 
developments. Therefore his mass appeal lay in his projection of himself as 
an outsider: the middle-class parvenu surrounded by Tory grandees; the 
spokesman for the oppressed white majority; the lone voice against Europe in 
the Conservative Party; the defender of Protestant Ulster’s freedom. Support 
for such causes may have been the death knell for his leadership ambitions, 
as he was unable to make the enduring connections necessary for such a role; 
however, his leadership existed in a less formal sense than through a political 
party or government. Powell’s political appeal lay in the fact that he was a self-
consciously lonesome leader.
We can view Powell as both an exemplar and an articulator of a post-imperial 
English nationalism, but one deeply rooted in the experience of empire. Here, 
then, is what Jonathan Hearn has referred to as the ‘ecology’ of Powell’s national 
identity and indeed his nationalism. Hearn argues that ‘the relationship between 
categorical and personal identities will always be mediated by intervening forms 
of social organisation’.1 For Powell, these social categories meditating his sense 
of national self were empire, state and locality. But here we run into a difficulty 
in examining English nationalism through a biographical approach to Enoch 
Powell: Powell not only identified strongly with England, but he also expressed 
it for others. To paraphrase Hearn, he fused his individual agency with the 
larger agency of the nation.2 But this was not merely an individual quest for 
power within one’s life. Powell sought to mobilise the English and British 
nation for political ends at a distinct moment in political time when previous 
national narratives were in flux. Powell self-consciously moved ‘against the 
1 Hearn, this volume. 
2 Ibid.
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historical flow’, talking of England as a nation nearing the end of its natural life 
and crucially under threat. But he also cast himself ‘against the flow’ of other 
social categories, notably party, in order to increase his popular appeal. Thus, 
his political charisma—in distinct contrast with his personal charisma—lay 
in an ambivalent relationship to the ‘ecology’ in which he operated: strongly 
influenced by a brief experience of empire, a deep veneration of the English 
state, but breaking free of the confines of party and living the life of a political 
loner in order to speak for the nation.
The Myth of Powell
On 25 February 1974, John Enoch Powell rose to address an audience in Saltaire 
in Yorkshire. On this occasion he commanded an audience of an estimated 1000 
people with another 1000 having been turned away. One older member of the 
audience claimed to have walked six miles to see Powell speak.3 This was a 
large audience for someone who was formally outside politics, having stood 
down as MP for Wolverhampton South-West at the beginning of the month. 
But in the previous six years, Powell had become one of the best-known and 
most controversial political figures in British politics. The audience cheered him 
and chanted his name as he rose to speak for the second time in a week on his 
decision to oppose the party he had been a member of only weeks before. The 
issue was Britain’s membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), 
the advent of which Powell could not reconcile in his conscience. This was the 
issue that led to his decision not to stand for re-election and indeed to advocate 
voting for the Labour opposition on polling day. But as he began to speak, a 
heckler from the audience yelled ‘Judas!’ ‘Electrified, Powell pointed to him. 
He shouted back: “Judas was paid! Judas was paid! I am making a sacrifice.”’4
This incident during the general election campaign of February 1974 is 
indicative of Powell’s political charisma and his ability to mobilise opinion—or 
at least strongly cohere sections of the public—with his ideas and rhetoric. The 
intensity of feeling in the hall that night spoke to the support he had gained for 
himself and his ideas during his political career, but especially since his infamous 
‘Rivers of Blood’ speech to the West Midlands Conservative Association in 
April 1968. The presence of a heckler, however, offended by his betrayal of 
the Conservative Party also attested to his divisiveness and not just amongst 
3 Warman, C. 1974, ‘Mr Powell reafirms EEC call but says “I shall die Tory”’, The Times, 26 February 1974.
4 Cited in Heffer, S. 1998, Like the Roman. The life of Enoch Powell, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, p. 704. 
A similar account of this incident is given by Cosgrave alongside a photograph of Powell in full verbal flood, 
although The Times from 26 February played down Powell’s emotive response and said that he responded to 
the heckler with the same retort but ‘grimly’. Cosgrave, P. 1989, The Lives of Enoch Powell, The Bodley Head, 
London.
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political opponents on the left. His response to the heckler also demonstrated a 
command of biblical knowledge that befitted a classical scholar and translator 
of the New Testament from Greek and a man who liked to wear his learning on 
his sleeve. His superior knowledge of the scene at the Garden of Gethsemane 
trumped his interlocutor and drew a rapturous response from his audience. In 
an instant it also refashioned Powell from the Betrayer to the Martyr.
This image of the brilliant yet persecuted loner outside the walls of party and 
answerable to nothing but his conscience was an essential part of Powell’s appeal. 
His charisma lay in his combination of logic and professorial analysis along 
with his emotional response and intensity of feeling towards certain issues. 
Combining this charisma with issues that were popular and populist, Powell 
drew support from across class and political cleavages and in doing so outlined 
a vision of the nation. But this vision was not one without contradictions. 
Powell’s logic and political style—or naivety—did not allow him to lead from 
within government. Importantly, if the balance between professorial logic and 
emotion was out in his thinking and rhetoric, his popular appeal diminished. 
Neither was he always able to translate his intellectual reasoning into political 
action with a mass appeal. Instead his popular appeal rested on him being the 
outsider ‘going against the flow’, a loner, leading a national community.
Enoch Powell died on 8 February 1998. The following morning The Sun said:
He always said what people in power didn’t want to hear. That was 
because Enoch Powell was almost always right. His death robs the 
country of one of the finest Conservative thinkers in history. Enoch 
didn’t care who he upset if he believed something needed to be said. 
What a change from today’s fawning Yes-men.5
The Sun’s bite-sized opinion encapsulated what we might call the ‘myth of 
Powell’: a narrative that aligned the wider social category of the nation with 
a widespread understanding of Powell’s role in public life. In this narrative, 
Powell was a thinker, a man of conscience and a man unsullied by the grubby 
compromises of quotidian politics. There is truth in all of this, although these 
qualities may not have made Powell a brilliant politician. But there can be 
no denying his impact on British politics in his day, or his continuing appeal 
amongst some members of the community. Margaret Thatcher described Powell 
as ‘magnetic’, adding that ‘there will never be anybody so compelling’.6 His 
most recent biographer, Simon Heffer, argued that ‘Powell’s contribution to 
British national life was greater and longer-lasting than most executive action 
5 ‘The Sun says…’, The Sun, 9 February 1998.
6 Wooding, D. 1998, ‘Maggie’s tribute as Enoch dies at 85’, The Sun, 9 February.
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could ever be. His effect on the thinking of others, from the highest ministerial 
level down to the British elector, was perhaps more profound than that of any 
other practicing politician of the twentieth century.’7
These assessments of Powell—only two amongst many—attest to the way in which 
he became a tribune for a new articulation of English nationalism, a nationalism 
that was both post-imperial and rooted in the experience and assumptions of 
England’s past. But even more than this, Powell actually embodied and lived 
English nationalism even as he acted it out. Powell experienced the Empire at 
the moment of its passing. Much of his political life was spent in an attempt to 
work out a coherent and consistent framework for English nationalism within 
a post-imperial British framework. Powell’s nationalism was both intelligent 
and narrow-minded; it was articulate, expressed with panache and at times 
spiteful. It was this attempt at a consistent underlying logic—unusual in 
British conservatism—which led him towards positions and statements that 
would challenge his party loyalty and make his continued membership of the 
Conservative Party untenable. But the consequences of this unyielding logic 
and Powell’s subsequent alienation from potential supporters added to his aura 
as a man of principle placing nation before party and personal interest, or, as 
Powell liked to put it, subsuming the part to the whole. 
Powell’s own actions put him at odds with many if not most of his colleagues and 
contributed to his ‘lonesomeness’, which in turn fed into the ‘myth of Powell’. 
This lonesomeness inspired respect and frustration in equal measure. Even 
those opposed to Powell’s views could register admiration for the man, usually 
predicated on his intellectual honesty. In the wake of the ‘Rivers of Blood’ 
speech, Vidya Anand and F. A. Ridley wrote of Powell’s ‘deserved reputation for 
his outstanding intellect and his political sagacity’.8 Similarly, Paul Foot, whilst 
portraying Powell’s Birmingham speech as an attempt to harness racist attitudes 
to help Powell win the leadership of the Conservative Party, could admire the 
way in which Powell cooperated with an obviously hostile commentator in the 
preparation of his Penguin Special on Powell and immigration, an attribute that 
made him stand out against some of his party colleagues.9 On the other hand, 
otherwise sympathetic observers such as Patrick Cosgrave could not help but 
notice that Powell was not the easiest of people to work with. ‘In no ordinary 
sense of the word’, wrote Cosgrave, ‘could Powell be called a good colleague. His 
interpretation of his duty, exact and honourable as it was, was at least gnomic, 
if not even Jesuitical.’10 Part of the reason for his expulsion from the Shadow 
7 Heffer, Like the Roman, p. 958.
8 Anand, V. and Ridley, F. 1969, The Enigma of Enoch Powell. An essay in political realism, Medusa Press, 
London, p. 9.
9 Foot, P. 1969, The Rise of Enoch Powell, An examination to Enoch Powell’s attitude to immigration and race, 
Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, UK, Preface.
10 Cosgrave, The Lives of Enoch Powell, p. 228.
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Cabinet in April 1968 was the declaration of two senior colleagues to the party 
leader that they would no longer work with Powell. Powell’s fall from grace 
might suggest another interpretation away from Anand and Ridley’s view of 
him as a ‘political maestro’ and tend in the direction of some sort of political 
naivety whereby the pursuit of logic and consistency was a death knell for his 
political ambitions (but not his popular appeal). So his sacking from the Shadow 
Cabinet freed him from the constraints of collective responsibility and pushed 
him closer to ‘the people’ on whose behalf, from this point on, he began to 
speak.
So in assessing Powell’s impact on the mobilisation of English nationalism as a 
political force in the late 1960s and early 1970s, we cannot divorce his personal 
identity from the issues that he espoused. Powell’s vision of the nation coalesced 
around four main issues: free-market neo-liberalism; opposing Britain’s part in 
the process of European integration; a defence of Northern Ireland’s integration 
within the United Kingdom; and anti-immigration. It was around the last issue 
that Powell had the greatest impact.
Postwar Britain experienced a labour shortage. During these years of austerity, 
many Britons migrated in the hope of a better future for themselves and their 
children. This population outflow exacerbated a labour shortage created by 
the demands of postwar reconstruction. The answer to this shortage was to 
bring in labour from the so-called New Commonwealth: essentially the ‘non-
White Dominions’ of the former empire. In a legal sense, migration to Britain 
was fairly straightforward since, until 1962, any subject of the Crown had the 
right of residence and employment in the United Kingdom. But in that year, 
the Conservative Government sought to restrict this inflow of ‘coloured’ labour. 
In the general election of 1964, the issue of race relations made an appearance 
in the constituency of Smethwick. But the issue of race really came to a head 
in 1968 over the Labour Government’s plans to introduce a Race Relations Bill.
Unlike Paul Foot’s analysis that Powell crudely used racism as part of an attempt 
to win the leadership of the Conservative Party from Edward Heath, it seems 
as if Powell had made some speeches about immigration in the years before 
1968. The speech he gave to the West Midlands Conservative Association in 
Birmingham on Saturday, 20 April 1968 was, however, quite different to any of 
his previous forays into the subject. In this speech, Powell mixed population 
projections based on figures gleaned from the Registrar-General with 
unsubstantiated anecdote: a perfect mixture of Powell’s emotion and logic. The 
speech was destined to attract press attention as it seemed to stray off Powell’s 
defence portfolio and last, and importantly, it was recorded on film. The vision 
of Britain contained in the speech was apocalyptic, conjuring visions of the 
slave revolts of the nineteenth century. ‘In twenty years time’, Powell relayed 
from an unnamed constituent, ‘the black man will have the whip-hand over the 
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white’.11 He went further in relaying the story of an elderly woman forced to 
move from her house, taunted as a ‘racialist’ by ‘wide-grinning piccaninnies’, 
situating the defence of British sovereignty right into the streets and homes 
of white people in his constituency of Wolverhampton South. He concluded 
that Britain as a nation must be ‘literally mad’ to allow continued immigration 
and defend the rights of such immigrant groups with instruments such as the 
proposed Race Relations Bill currently before Parliament.
The speech created a political uproar. Powell was sacked from the Shadow 
Cabinet the following Sunday evening. But the speech, and Powell’s sacking, 
also mobilised support for him across existing political and class boundaries, 
establishing that Powell was most politically appealing as an outsider. On 
Tuesday, 23 April, dockers from London’s West India docks went on strike and 
marched in support of Powell’s right to ‘free speech’, immediately identifying 
Powell as a lone voice within the political Establishment.12 The following day meat 
packers from Smithfield market struck and marched to the House of Commons, 
presenting Powell with a 92-page petition in his support. Letters flooded into his 
London home at the rate of four or five sacks per delivery, amounting to a total 
of about 40 000 letters within four days, of which Powell claimed that only about 
a dozen were opposed to his views.13 Powell’s speech gained support from other 
anti-Establishment figures on the right, beginning the sense that Powell might 
be a sophist, but his political constituency was right-wing populist and radical. 
Policy Director of the newly formed National Front, A. K. Chesterton, claimed 
that Powell’s views did not vary in any way from those of the National Front, 
whilst Oswald Mosley claimed that Powell was only saying what Mosley himself 
had said nine years earlier.14 At the end of a giddying week in politics, The Times 
commented that ‘[o]ver the past six days, Mr Powell has stirred the national 
emotions more than any other single politician since the war’.15 But aside from 
this potential rupturing of support for a Labour government and legitimisation 
of views held by the extreme right, the greatest immediate impact was on the 
Conservative Party. Tory leader, Edward Heath, initially struggled to balance 
support for Powell over immigration whilst maintaining party unity. Powell’s 
sacking in April resolved this problem in the short term, but set a precedent for 
subsequent action regarding European integration: a principled stand followed 
by more effective politicking free from Cabinet or party constraints. Powell’s 
stance appealed to the right wing of the Conservative Party, in particular the 
Monday Club, whom he addressed in November 1968. On 12 February 1969, 
Powell and Duncan Sandys introduced a bill seeking to amend the immigration 
11 Cited in Lord Howard of Rising (ed.) 2012, Enoch at 100. A re-examination of the life, politics and philosophy 
of Enoch Powell, Biteback Publishing, London, p. 173.
12 ‘Dockers march for Powell’, The Times, 24 April 1968.
13 ‘Mounting volume of race protest. 40,000 Powell postbag’, The Times, 25 April 1968.
14 Labour Research Department 1969, Powell and His Allies, LRD Publications, London, pp. 15–16.
15 Trethowan, I. 1968, ‘Mr Enoch Powell: a Cromwell or a Goldwater?’, The Times, 26 April 1968.
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laws by restricting the right of dependants of migrants to entry to the United 
Kingdom, supported by a significant number of senior Conservatives including 
the up-and-coming Margaret Thatcher.16 Powell’s legacy, however, may well 
have been beneficial in electoral terms: an NOP survey during the 1970 election 
found that 18 per cent of usually Labour voters said they had voted Conservative 
because of Powell and a further 22 per cent had considered doing so.17
Another issue over which Powell was outspoken and garnered popular support 
was Britain’s part in the deepening process of European integration focused on 
negotiations for the United Kingdom’s accession to the EEC and the referendum 
on Britain’s continuing participation in the Common Market in 1975. Here again, 
Powell was out of step with his party; indeed he resigned from the Conservative 
Party ahead of the February 1974 election since he could not endorse Britain’s 
membership of the EEC. He went so far as to urge the electorate to vote Labour 
since that party at least might hold a referendum on continuing membership, 
implying in a televised interview on 26 February that he had already done 
so himself by postal vote.18 Again we see Powell’s strong identification with 
the nation coupled with the need to have himself expelled from political 
organisations in order to act upon matters of principle. The Common Market 
issue and his stance on it allowed Powell to further articulate his vision of the 
nation as irrevocably linked with the enduring sovereignty of the Crown-in-
Parliament as well as to place himself again in the position of the loner and man 
of principle who always put nation before party. Although no longer a candidate 
standing for Parliament, Powell could still draw crowds greater even than the 
Leader of the Opposition and his erstwhile chief, Edward Heath.19 By the end 
of the election campaign, Powell felt he could not remain silent on the threat 
posed to the sovereignty of the Crown-in-Parliament by Britain’s membership 
of the EEC. Accordingly, he re-entered the political fray, simultaneously placing 
himself at odds with Edward Heath and putting nation before party. At Saltaire 
in Yorkshire on the night of 25 February, Powell defended his decision to vote 
Labour. Claiming that the defence of Britain’s national and political inheritance 
had never been the preserve of one party alone, Powell declared ‘[i]n that 
defence a citizen may without inconsistency or discredit stand side by side with 
those from whom on lesser matters, however important in themselves, he totally 
dissents’.20 With regard to the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition, he 
added in eloquent yet populist tones that 
the miracles of tergiversation which the present Administration has 
accomplished leave nothing to admire cessors in that department. In 
16 Labour Research Department, Powell and His Allies, p. 22.
17 Cosgrave, The Lives of Enoch Powell, p. 289.
18 Sweeney, C. 1974, ‘Mr Powell has voted by post for Labour’, The Times, 27 February 1974.
19 Warman, The Times, 26 February 1974.
20 Ibid.
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the prowess of their predeacrobatics the previous Prime Minister 
[Harold Wilson] for all his nimbleness and skill is simply no match for 
the breathtaking, thoroughgoing efficiency of the present one [Edward 
Heath].21
As in 1970 when it seemed that Powell helped win the election for the 
Conservatives, it seemed that in February 1974 Powell foiled Heath’s attempt to 
form a parliamentary majority, opening the way for Wilson to form a minority 
government in March.
There were, however, severe limits to Powell’s appeal, partly to do with the 
translation of his personal identity into his political one. What emerges from a 
consideration of the issues of immigration and European integration was that 
Powell was articulating a vision of the English nation predicated upon a defence 
of (Crown-in-Parliament) sovereignty, but it was a vision of the nation in which 
his charisma, personality and logical approach to issues also prevented him from 
broadening his support base. Indeed, in the early 1970s there were some tongue-
in-cheek references to Wolverhampton-les-deux-Eglises, a reference to General de 
Gaulle’s residence to which he retreated before assuming leadership of the Fifth 
Republic in 1958. Powell’s precocious belief in a neo-liberal and deregulated 
economy, however, did not allow him to make quick common cause with the 
dockers or mobilise the meat packers in April 1968. When presented with the 
petition by the striking Smithfield workers outside Parliament, Powell thanked 
them but discouraged them from taking further industrial action, advising them 
to write to their MPs instead. Here was an example of how Powell’s logic on 
race and industrial relations—both internally coherent—clashed. But although 
these fears of Powell as a latter-day de Gaulle or Mosley can be understood, 
there were certain contradictions that arose from Powell’s unusually logical 
approach to the nation, which resulted in the vision of England bequeathed 
to posterity by Powell being close to his own political personality and profile: 
readily articulated, somewhat resentful and not quite part of the mainstream 
but always present in the wings.
To understand why this was the case, we need to examine Powell’s vision of 
England. Powell’s thinking about the nation had cohered somewhat since the 
mid 1950s when he co-authored a book with Angus Maude entitled Biography 
of a Nation: A short history ofBritain. In the introduction, Powell and Maude 
run up against the illogical and subjective bulwarks of the nation. ‘There is no 
objective definition of what constitutes a nation’, they wrote: 
It is that which thinks it is a nation. Race, language, geography—none 
of these is conclusive. If geography made a nation, there would not be 
21 Ibid.
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two nations in Ireland today. If identity of language were the key, the 
Swiss would not be one nation, yet they are. As for race, Hitler looked 
for it as a basis of nationhood, with all that was left of German learning 
and science to help him, but failed to find it.22
In short, they concluded that ‘[n]ations are the units of mankind as a political 
animal’.23 Yet to this ultimately political definition was added a biological one, 
the refutation of Hitler’s racism notwithstanding: ‘Yet however intensively it is 
studied, this phenomenon of national consciousness in mankind remains almost 
as mysterious as that of the life of the individual organism.’24 His and Maude’s 
history of Britain was almost elegiac, concerning itself with the way that
the consciousness of being a nation began among the English; how 
it grew and changed, embracing with various intensity and various 
meaning the inhabitants not only of these islands but of countries and 
continents across the world; and how that consciousness is now waning 
and its limits shrinking as if some natural span were nearing its close.25
As the 1950s wore on, Powell sharpened his concept of the nation and—in 
England’s case at least—linked it to a certain vision of homogeneity under the 
Crown-in-Parliament. Writing in the National and English Review in August 
1958, Powell reflected on his sojourn in Australia as Professor of Greek at 
Sydney University in the late 1930s and commented on the White Australia 
Policy, which had underpinned Australia’s national imaginings since Federation 
in 1901: ‘Finding herself providentially lacking the elements of racial division, 
yet able to achieve her national development without creating them’, wrote 
Powell, ‘Australia would be worse than foolish if she did not jealously preserve 
the advantage of an all-white population’, adding that ‘there will be problems 
enough in the assimilation of the “new Australians” from Europe’.26 But by the 
1960s, Australia and Britain were different in many regards: in Australia the 
mood was one of optimistic national development, whereas Powell believed that 
Britain was gripped by a resignation to relative decline. It was this resignation 
that, in his view, was blighting politics and the national spirit:
The British are a parliamentary nation: internally and externally they 
are conditioned and defined by that institution and that historical 
experience. If our values are in danger, and if our freedom and 
22 Maude, A. and Powell, E. 1955, Biography of a Nation: A short history ofBritain, Phoenix House, London, 
p. 7.
23 Ibid., p. 7.
24 Ibid., p. 8.
25 Ibid., p. 9.
26 Powell, E. 1958, ‘Development down under’, National and English Review, August, pp. 67–70.
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independence are in danger, it is because Parliament is endangered, 
and endangered in the only way an institution can be—by inner loss of 
conviction.27
Powell came to believe that the way to prolong England’s natural span was to 
reverse the inner loss of conviction and defend it from threats inside and out. 
More and more he linked the nation with homogeneity under the sovereignty 
of the Crown-in-Parliament. The link between the threat to Parliament’s 
sovereignty and the provisions and finalité of the Treaty of Rome are easy to 
discern. Powell outlined them in one of his first speeches against the Common 
Market in Smethwick during 1969:
The precondition for any political unity is the subordination of the parts 
to the whole. Short of force, this can only come about through a section 
settled and deep instinctive conviction felt by those concerned that they 
belong first and foremost to the whole and that its interest[s] override 
those of the parts. Unless and until that conviction exists, democratic or 
representative institutions are unworkable. On the other hand, without 
such institutions, the acts of sovereignty, which a political unit must 
perform on behalf of all its members and binding on all its members, 
would be intolerable and unacceptable.28
This similar logic of homogeneity also informed some of his thinking regarding 
the consequences of immigration, or more particularly, the concentration of 
immigrant communities in England’s cities. Speaking to the Monday Club in 
April 1976, Powell logically imagined a homogenous immigrant community in 
parliamentary political terms. If 5 per cent of the population was ‘coloured’ 
or ‘black’, Powell mused, adding ‘it tends to be brought under one single 
classification in order to enhance its leverage’, then in a quota system it would 
require 32 MPs—more than the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, the Ulster 
Unionist Party and Liberals combined. Powell went on:
I need not follow the analysis further in order to demonstrate how 
parliamentary democracy disintegrates when the national homogeneity 
of the electorate is broken down by a large and sharp alteration in the 
composition of the population. While the institutions and liberties on 
which British liberty depends are being progressively surrendered to 
the European superstate, the forces which will sap and destroy them 
from within are allowed to accumulate unchecked.29
27 Cited in Ritchie, R. 1978, Nation or No Nation? Six years in British politics, BT Batsford, London, p. 134.
28 Powell, E. 1969, Speech on the Common Market to a public meeting at the Warley College of Technology, 
Smethwick, 5 September 1969, Anti-Common Market League, London.
29 Cited in Ritchie, Nation or No Nation, p. 166.
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More and more, Powell was guided by emotion rather at the expense of the 
logical precision that even his detractors had admired in the 1960s. In 1988 
Powell estimated that ‘in the foreseeable future’ (again displaying what was 
becoming an uncharacteristic lack of precision on this subject), the ‘New 
Commonwealth’ ethnic population will represent one-third or more of the 
population of inner London and other cities in England. This will be more than 
sufficient to secure effective political control locally and nationally ‘by dint of 
its distinctiveness and solidarity’, and this point could not be reached ‘without 
civil strife of a degree that makes it indistinguishable from civil war’.30 This lack 
of precision—the emotion minus the logic compounded by hyperbole—had the 
effect of leaving his core support unchanged, but allowed his opponents more 
and more room to attack the basic assumptions of his arguments.
The logic of cleaving closely to a Parliamentary definition of nationhood was 
now skewing the analysis. In such a manner did Powell’s charisma start to break 
down. Much of his appeal rested on the combination of logic and emotion 
giving him the aura of being ‘almost always right’, to quote The Sun’s obituary 
cited above. But when these two elements were decoupled, the spell weakened 
and all that was left was an emotive man speaking out in what seemed to those 
unimpressed by his use of language, history and numbers a nasty advocacy of 
what we would today call ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, defending the unity 
of parliamentary sovereignty in Ulster may have been sound reasoning, but it 
was not good politics from the point of view of mass mobilisation in England. 
Indeed his adherence to Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty arguably weakened 
his ability to mobilise popular sovereignty. Powell was indeed populist, as many 
had long realised. ‘Powellism is a subtly constructed appeal’, wrote the Sunday 
Times Magazine on 29 December 1968: 
It is populist and more. It will unite Mrs Mary Whitehouse, the old lady 
who campaigns against electricity pylons or tree fellers, the resentful 
poor, the racialist poor, the red-tape haters, the weak, the halt and the 
lame. All those who hunger for a good thumping cause, country and 
flag.31
But at the same time, Powell struggled to reconcile what Tom Nairn identified 
as ‘the necessary resort to populism’ in nationalist mobilisation32 with the 
sovereignty of Parliament. Speaking at Chester-le-Street in January 1972, Powell 
told his audience that ‘[t]he power is still the people’s if they have the will 
30 Cited in Lewis, R. 1988, Anti-Racism. A mania exposed, Quartet Books, London, un-numbered page in 
introduction.
31 Cited in Labour Research Department, Powell and His Allies, p. 23.
32 Nairn, T. 1981 [1977], The Break-Up of Britain. Crisis and neo-nationalism, New Left Books, London, p. 
339.
Humanities Research Vol XIX . No .1 .2013
56
to use it’.33 But Powell couldn’t divorce this incipient ‘People Power’ from his 
understanding of Parliament and a Burkean view of representative democracy. 
As far as Powell was concerned, the development of the EEC was a direct threat 
to the nation since it was a threat to Parliament. This fact can explain some of 
Powell’s initial prevarication over whether or not to support a referendum on 
EEC membership. Eventually, though, Powell supported a referendum, thereby 
undermining the sovereignty of the institution that he sought to defend. 
But if his logical drive to defend the nation by defending Parliament through 
a referendum was straining even Powell’s intellectual abilities, there were 
other areas where his personality and logical approach undercut his potential 
mobilisation of English nationalism. The first of these was the fact that Powell 
was not a ‘clubbable’ man. This meant that what could seem like a principled 
stand by a lone tribune actually translated into an unwillingness to work with 
other people—and the feeling was often mutual. This ‘aloneness’ meant that 
Powell was not able to form the necessary political alliances that would have 
enabled him to fully capitalise on his popularity post 1968. As the campaign to 
derail the accession to the Treaty of Rome grew in Parliament in the early 1970s, 
Nigel Spearing MP assessed Powell’s likely actions in a letter to Labour Anti-
Marketeer Peter Shore:
It would therefore seem likely that [Powell] will launch an individual 
anti-market campaign…This could be either chauvinistic, or more 
likely on post-imperial criteria. I suggest that his Indian background is 
a very important influence. If Powell believes what he says, and I think 
he does, he will try to destroy Heath rather than see us sign the Treaty.34
This excerpt also points to other dimensions of Powell’s attitudes and actions 
that could be perceived as principled stands but which had more prosaic roots. 
Powell was only human and part of his antipathy towards the EEC was that it 
was the pet project of Edward Heath. Powell hated Heath and the feeling was 
mutual (Heath’s silence when Powell died in 1998 was deafening). So what was 
in part a clash of ideals over the future of Britain and the lessons to be learned 
from Europe’s past was also in considerable part a clash of personalities.
Powell’s self-presentation as a loner was good for his persecuted image; his 
principled stand on particular issues was a similarly important plank of his 
charismatic appeal, but it was not necessarily good politics. In certain ways, 
then, Powell, if not exactly the ‘Patron Saint of Lost Causes’, could more plausibly 
be described as the ‘Patron Saint of Rearguard Actions’. Nor did Powell offer 
a compelling vision of Britain’s future, except one rooted in England’s past. 
33 Powell, E. 1973,Common Market: Renegotiate or come out, Elliot Right Way Books, Kingswood, UK, p. 118.
34 Spearing, N. 1971, Letter to Peter Shore MP, 31 May 1971, British Library of Political and Economic 
Sciences, SHORE/9/44 [Miscellaneous, 1971].
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Such then is the enigma of Enoch Powell: of an intellectually brilliant man and 
a political maestro seeking at once to lead contemporary Britain in two ways, 
both new and old.35
Similarly, Powell’s seeming mass appeal needs to be closely examined. Whilst it 
is true that there were strikes and marches in support of Powell’s ‘right to free 
speech’ on the issue of immigration and race relations in 1968, there were also 
demonstrations against Powell and his views. Tony Barrett, a spokesman at the 
Tilbury Docks, stated that ‘many dockers are disgusted by the support shown 
to Mr Powell’.36 The actions of Ray Campbell supporting those marching for 
Powell should give us pause, too. Campbell, described by The Times as ‘a West 
Indian’, told its reporter that ‘I do not agree with what Mr Powell said, but the 
men are my mates and they treat me alright. I’m going out with them to show 
support for the union.’37 This evidence alone shows that there were dynamics at 
play other than the force of Powell’s ideas alone.
And then there was the hostility to Powell and the implication of his ideas. 
The ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech caused a storm of controversy. The Reverend 
Canon Mark Green feared for the effects of such attitudes on society, and asked 
rhetorically ‘are we simply to tear up all [the New Testament] says about the 
reconciliation of races?’38 And whilst Powell’s historical memory was filled with 
the development and expansion of the institutions of British representative 
government, other observers’ view of history was more contemporary. One 
former Conservative MP, Humphrey Berkeley, said that Powell’s speech was 
‘the most disgraceful public utterance since the days of Sir Oswald Mosley’,39 
which put him in common cause with Frank Cousins, General Secretary of the 
Transport and General Workers Union, who reminded strikers that before the 
war the dockers were the ones who marched against the Blackshirts.40
In short, Powell’s views and style were ultimately too divisive to mobilise a 
broad and enduring national base, and his logical defence of Crown-in-
Parliament sovereignty shied him away from any Gaullist authoritarianism. 
Certainly Powell was able to cohere a significant section of the electorate around 
issues such as immigration, Europe, taxation and the economy. His principled 
defence of parliamentary sovereignty in Ulster gained him support, too, but far 
less so in England. Furthermore, Powell’s ideas had a legacy that was taken up 
by others in the Conservative Party, and his status as the conscience of the party 
was strong during the years of Thatcherite ascendency. Many of his causes 
35 Anand and Ridley, The Enigma of Enoch Powell, p. 23.
36 ‘Dockers march for Powell’, The Times, 24 April 1968.
37 Ibid.
38 Green, M. 1968, ‘Letter to the Editor’, The Times, 29 April 1968.
39 ‘Mosley speeches recalled’, The Times, 22 April 1968.
40 ‘Mounting volume of race protest. 40,000 Powell postbag’, The Times, 25 April 1968.
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were championed between 1979 and 1990, but many were not (or rather the 
ideas were championed but the policy actions spoke differently). A free-market 
economy was implemented by the Thatcherites, who also took a hard line on 
immigration. But only in Thatcher’s later years as Prime Minister did she adopt 
a Powellite line on Europe, and with disastrous results for her and her party 
after she left Downing Street in 1990. Ulster was not treated as an unequivocally 
integral part of the United Kingdom after 1985. The final failure of Powell’s 
mass mobilisation was signalled by the Conservative Party leadership under 
David Cameron as it positioned itself for government between 2005 and 2010. In 
‘detoxifying’ the Conservative brand and attempting to redress the image of the 
Tories as a ‘nasty’ party, Cameron was quick to move away from the ‘toxic trio’ 
of policy issues: immigration, Europe and tax.41
Powell was a divisive figure and his obituaries are a testament to that. Former 
chancellor Norman Lamont described him as ‘the greatest politician of my 
lifetime…a genuine giant amongst pygmies’. But Denis Healey had a different 
view: 
Enoch was an intellectual in the worst sense of the word. He would 
pursue everything to its logical conclusion, even if it made political 
nonsense…The best thing he ever did was marry Pamela who is a very 
nice human being. Enoch was a bit short on the human side.42
These views encapsulate some of Powell’s charisma and also why Powell failed 
to mobilise English nationalism in an enduring way. His personal appeal was 
based on his combination of logical precision and emotional engagement with 
causes he clearly felt passionate about. This logical approach to politics forced 
him out of government and led him to adopt causes that were not politically 
advantageous in the formal career sense, but which gained him wide support in 
the country. This tendency also led him to be perceived as a loner outside the 
constraints of politics at a time when principle seemed in short supply. But there 
were tensions in his logical approach to English nationalism, most specifically 
in the relationship between popular and parliamentary sovereignty, tensions 
that reduced the logical consistency of Powell’s approach and thereby some 
of his appeal. Furthermore, as many people were repelled by Powell’s ideas as 
were attracted to them. Since his ideas were put forward with such eloquence—
though at times the sophistry obfuscated as much as it illuminated—there 
was much for his critics to attack, and the cold logician could repel as well 
as attract, inhibiting Powell from building important and enduring political 
alliances related to his causes. And even though the issues he chose, especially 
immigration and race, resonated with a broad base, ultimately he could cohere 
41 Bale, T. 2010, The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Cameron, Polity, London. 
42 Lamont, N. and Healey, D. 1998, ‘Hero and villain: opinion’, The Sun, 9 February 1998.
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only a core group of supporters who saw in Powell a far-sighted man of principle 
whose stance caused him to remain the outspoken, yet lonesome, tribune of the 
English nation.
